The recent movement of regulatory agencies toward probabilistic analyses of human health and environmental risks has focused greater attention on the quality of the estimates of variability and uncertainty that underlie them. Of particular concern is how uncertainty -a measure of what is not known -is characterized, as uncertainty can play an influential role in analyses of the need for regulatory controls or in estimates of the economic value of additional research. This paper reports the second phase of a study, conducted as an element of the National Human Exposure Assessment Survey ( NHEXAS ), to obtain and calibrate exposure assessment experts' judgments about uncertainty in residential ambient, residential indoor, and personal air benzene concentrations experienced by the nonsmoking, nonoccupationally exposed population in U.S. EPA's Region V. Subjective judgments ( i.e., the median, interquartile range, and 90% confidence interval ) about the means and 90th percentiles of each of the benzene distributions were elicited from the seven experts participating in the study. The calibration or quality of the experts' judgments was assessed by comparing them to the actual measurements from the NHEXAS Region V study using graphical techniques, a quadratic scoring rule, and surprise and interquartile indices. The results from both quantitative scoring methods suggested that, considered collectively, the experts' judgments were relatively well calibrated although on balance, underconfident. The calibration of individual expert judgments appeared variable, highlighting potential pitfalls in reliance on individual experts. In a surprising finding, the experts' judgments about the 90th percentiles of the benzene distributions were better calibrated than their predictions about the means; the experts tended to be overconfident in their ability to predict the means. This paper is also one of the first calibration studies to demonstrate the importance of taking into account intraexpert correlation on the statistical significance of the findings. When the judgments were assumed to be independent, analysis of the surprise and interquartile indices found evidence of poor calibration ( P < 0.05 ). However, when the intraexpert correlation in the study was taken into account, these findings were no longer statistically significant. The analysis further found that the experts' judgments scored better than estimates of Region V benzene concentrations simply drawn from earlier studies of ambient, indoor and personal benzene levels in other U.S. cities. These results suggest the value of careful elicitation of expert judgments in characterizing exposures in probabilistic form. Additional calibration studies need to be undertaken to corroborate and extend these findings.
Introduction
Uncertainty pervades any effort to characterize environmental and human health risks quantitatively. It influences both the degree of confidence that can be placed in any results and decisions that may derive from them. The scientific community and, more recently, the regulatory community have begun to endorse use of probabilistic methods to analyze potential environmental and health risks so that uncertainty is more explicitly expressed and available for consideration in research and regulatory decisions.
Techniques do exist for characterizing uncertainty. Scientists know how to characterize uncertainty when the data available are rich and relevant to the problem at hand. Likewise, numerous investigators have demonstrated the use of subjective methods to characterize quantitatively the state of knowledge about a subject when data are sparse or are not directly relevant. Most recently, the first part of this study (Walker et al., 2001 ) demonstrated how subjective judgment elicitation methods can be applied to the assessment of environmental exposures.
Once characterized, either empirically or subjectively, the existence of uncertainty is also not a problem for analysts. Standard methods exist for analysis of the impact of uncertain variables through analytical and numerical methods for the propagation of error ( Bevington, 1969; Box et al., 1978; Evans et al., 1984; Fiering et al., 1984; Seiler, 1987 ) . Numerous papers have been published in recent years on the use of Monte Carlo simulation techniques to model both variability and uncertainty in probabilistic form. Decision analytic techniques have been available for many years to assist decision makers faced with choices based on uncertain outcomes ( Raiffa, 1968 ) .
The problem is that these methods only yield valid results if the inputs to them are themselves valid. The question of how well uncertainty has been characterized is particularly difficult when existing data are inadequate and a greater degree of subjective judgment must be used. Explicit acknowledgment and characterization of expert judgments about uncertainty in environmental risk assessment are still relatively uncommon. Evaluations of the quality of such judgments are rarer still, yet without them, it is difficult to know whether the judgments, and the analyses that depend on them, are ultimately valid.
How is ''quality'' of a probabilistic judgment defined? In the subjective judgment literature, the quality of a judgment is defined in terms of both how accurately the judgment about a quantity estimates the ''truth'' and how well it really describes what the expert knows about the subject. Good judgments can only come from experts who are ''well calibrated, '' 1 to use the term from the subjective judgment literature. A ''well -calibrated'' expert is one who can appropriately describe in probabilistic terms how well he or she knows the response to a particular question. For a given set of questions, two individuals might give the same set of responses but place different probabilities on their likelihood of being correct. Even if they both get the same percentage of questions correct, the individual who, a priori, was able to predict how well he or she could answer the questions is better calibrated than the other individual. The well-calibrated expert has good ''self -knowledge'' -she knows how much she knows ( Hawkins and Evans, 1989 ). An individual who places a lower probability on being correct than he or she is subsequently shown to have been when the truth is revealed is underconfident. The individual who places a higher probability on being correct than his or her performance ultimately warrants is considered overconfident. Like other forms of bias, underconfidence or overconfidence can yield misleading results, which in turn may have important implications for research and regulatory decisions.
How good are the subjective judgments of experts? Most of what we know comes from studies of lay judgments, and suggests that individuals are not well calibrated. Lichtenstein et al. (1982 ) and Morgan and Henrion (1990 ) summarized the results from several calibration studies in the literature, where individuals were asked to give confidence intervals for specific quantities (typically 98% confidence intervals ). Good calibration in such studies is defined by having the true value for the quantity falling outside the credible interval no more than 2% of the time (i.e., a ''surprise index'' of 2% ). With some exceptions, Lichtenstein et al. ( 1982 ) reported surprise indices in the range of 5 -50% indicating that the credible intervals did not contain the truth as often as the subjects predicted.
An important limitation of the findings reported in these reviews from the standpoint of the evaluation of expert judgments is that most of the studies discussed did not involve experts giving judgments about questions within their own domain of expertise. More commonly, the studies involved lay people, often students, tested on almanac questions (e.g., the number of newspapers sold in the United States in 1986 ). The relevance of almanac studies for understanding the ability of experts to make well -calibrated judgments is suspect ( Morgan and Henrion, 1990 ) .
Studies of experts' abilities to make probabilistic judgments in their own domain of expertise suggest that experts do not always fare much better than their lay counterparts. Evidence of poor calibration has been reported in studies of geotechnical engineers (Hynes and Van Marcke, 1976 ) , physicians (Winkler and Poses, 1993) , nuclear power plant operators ( Cooke, 1991 ) , and forecasters of energy demand (Shlyakhter et al., 1994 ) .
In professions where experts receive regular feedback on their judgments, calibration of probabilistic judgments can be much better. Weather forecasters are known to be relatively well calibrated Winkler, 1977, 1992 ) . Cooke ( 1991 ) found that managers in a consulting company could accurately predict the probabilities that their project proposals would be accepted by prospective funding agencies. Winkler and Poses (1993 ) reported that hospital physicians asked to predict the survival of patients admitted to an intensive care unit were also well calibrated.
Only one study to date has assessed the calibration of exposure assessment experts' probabilistic judgments. Hawkins and Evans ( 1989 ) asked 24 industrial hygienists to predict toluene concentrations in air given only information about a batch chemical process; their judgments were then compared with measured values. Only two thirds of the experts gave credible intervals that intersected the truth, and c 2 goodness-of -fit tests indicated poor agreement between the judgments and experimental results. However, when 1 In subjective judgment research, calibration has a similar meaning as in exposure assessment where an instrument is first tested to determine if it is giving a ''true'' measurement as defined by an appropriate standard and, if not, is subsequently adjusted until it does. Originally, calibration methods were developed for use during elicitations to provide feedback to those giving the judgments in hopes of causing them to ''adjust'' their subsequent judgments closer what they truly knew, i.e., to help them be more ''self -knowledgeable'' and thus, better calibrated. In more recent studies, as in this one, the term calibration refers to the first step only.
given limited historical measurement data, the experts' predictions improved dramatically.
A dilemma facing analysts interested in studying the quality of probabilistic estimates of uncertainty is that attention should ideally focus on the dominant sources of uncertainty. Most analysts in the field of environmental risk analysis would agree, however, that uncertainty in doseresponse relationships often overwhelms any uncertainty from other sources including exposure ( Taylor et al., 1993, Thompson and Evans, 1997 ) . Other studies have suggested that uncertainty in dose response may span orders of magnitude ( Evans et al., 1994 ) .
However, we may never know how good these estimates of uncertainty are. Exposure assessment, on the other hand, offers more opportunities for learning about the quality of probabilistic judgments. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ( U.S. EPA's ) National Human Exposure Assessment Survey (NHEXAS ) is one of them (Pellizzari et al., 1995; Sexton, 1995) . Phase I of NHEXAS was designed to evaluate multimedia, multipathway exposures to environmental contaminants, benzene among them.
In this paper, Part II of our investigation into the use of subjective expert judgment in exposure assessment, we report on the calibration of the experts' judgments obtained in Part I of the study ( Walker et al., 2001 ) . Using two calibration methods, we compare the experts' probabilistic estimates of the mean and 90th percentile of the distributions of 6 -day averaged residential ambient, residential indoor, and personal air concentrations of benzene for the NHEXAS Region V pilot study population to the actual findings from the NHEXAS study.
We also address another limitation of most previous calibration studies: that they do not take into account the impact of correlations -both within ( intra -) and between ( inter-) experts -on the statistical significance of their findings. We know such correlations exist, particularly in studies like this one where the experts are giving judgments about quantities that are functions of one another and which depend, to varying extent, on the same underlying data base.
Methods
Calibration of expert judgments requires the judgments themselves, an independent measure of the ''truth,'' and appropriate methods for comparing them.
The Judgments
The judgments calibrated in this paper are the experts' predictions about the mean and 90th percentile of the residential ambient, residential indoor, and personal air concentrations ( exposure ) in EPA Region V. As discussed in detail in Part I of our study, seven experts knowledgeable about various facets of benzene personal exposure were chosen through a peer-nomination process, attended a group workshop to discuss the project and data relevant to the questions, and participated in a formal elicitation of their individual judgments ( Walker et al., 2001) .
During the elicitations, we obtained two sets of judgments from the experts. Both concerned ambient, indoor, and personal exposures to benzene that might be experienced by nonsmoking, nonoccupationally exposed populations of Region V. The difference between the two was that the first sought to characterize the true exposures of the entire population of Region V whereas the second focused on the measured exposures of the sample population studied in Phase I of NHEXAS ( Pellizzari et al., 1995 ) . The two sets of judgments may differ either because of dissimilarities between the sample population and the full population of Region V or because of any biases or imprecision in the methods used to measure benzene. It is this second set of judgments that we calibrate in this paper using the actual results from the NHEXAS study.
To elicit this second set of judgments, authors Katherine D. Walker and David MacIntosh worked with each of the experts to identify both sources and magnitude of potential biases and uncertainties in the NHEXAS sample results relative to the ''true, but unknown'' levels of benzene in the ambient, indoor, and personal air of residents of Region V. These biases or uncertainties might arise from issues in the NHEXAS' study design or implementation. Most experts adjusted their initial probability distributions about the ''true, but unknown'' mean and 90th percentiles of ambient, indoor, and personal air benzene concentrations in Region V accordingly. For the purpose of this study, they assumed that these biases or uncertainties were ones that would not be adjusted for in the reporting of the NHEXAS study results.
The ''Truth'' Data from the NHEXAS Region V Phase I study (Pellizzari et al., 1995 ) served as the basis for the calibration of the experts' predictions about the concentrations of benzene in ambient, indoor and personal air. As part of the NHEXAS study, samples were taken to measure benzene and other volatile organic chemicals in the ambient air surrounding residential properties, the indoor air of those properties, and the personal air of one individual selected from the sample residence. Six -day integrated average air samples were taken using 3M 3520 (dual stage ) passive charcoal badges. The NHEXAS data reflect measurements from a stratified random sample of homes in Region V.
We obtained mean and 90th percentile values from the distributions of ambient, indoor and personal air concentrations measured in the NHEXAS study (Pellizzari, 1998, personal communication ) . These are shown in Table 1 .
The scoring rule used to evaluate calibration of the experts in this study requires comparison of the experts' estimates with the observed values. Given sampling and analytical error, we know that any reported mean or 90th percentile will also be uncertain. The 90% confidence limits reported for the NHEXAS results are shown in Table 1 . However, for the purposes of this study ( and consistent with the calibration literature ), the mean and 90th percentiles of the sample data for ambient, indoor and personal air benzene concentration are each assumed to be known perfectly.
Calibration Methods
Several methods have been proposed in the literature to calibrate judgments in the form of continuous probability distributions. We use two approaches in this paper; a numerical scoring rule and calculation of the surprise and interquartile indices.
Scoring Rules Several different forms of scoring rules have been proposed ( Brier, 1950; Murphy, 1972 Murphy, , 1973 Matheson and Winkler, 1976; DeGroot and Fienberg, 1983 ) but all essentially give a mathematical measure of the distance between the predicted probabilities and observed frequencies. Scoring rules were originally developed as aids in eliciting probabilities; they provided feedback to subjects in pilot studies and were intended to induce well -calibrated judgments in final elicitations ( Cooke, 1991 ) . Their use in elicitation is currently less common although not absent from recent literature (Van Lenthe, 1993 ) . Scoring rules are still used for comparing the performance of experts within studies (Winkler and Poses, 1993 ) and may be used in assigning weights to experts when combining judgments ( Cooke, 1991 ) .
Two attributes of experts' judgments are of potential interest to decision makers: how well their predictions of what they know match reality and the degree of sharpness or precision in their performance. We have chosen to use a scoring rule proposed by Matheson and Winkler ( 1976 ) .
Their scoring rule partitions the classic Brier ( 1950 ) score 3 developed to evaluate weather forecasters into two parts, a ''calibration'' or ''honesty'' term and an ''expertise'' or ''sharpness'' term. The discrete version of their scoring rule used in our study is shown below:
where, S = the value of the score; R i =the ith fractile assigned by the expert to a particular value of the quantity being elicited (e.g., mean ambient benzene concentration ); F i = the frequency with which the ''truth'' falls at or below the value associated with the ith fractile; g i =the weight assigned to ith fractile (uniform weights assumed in this paper ); and n = number of fractiles. Matheson and Winkler ( 1976 ) envisioned R i and F i to be distributions defined for a common entity using either a discrete or continuous set of values. They defined F i as the experts' true underlying distribution for a quantity, the distribution to which the expert should come as close as possible with his stated probability distribution, R i .
The first term of the score, the calibration term, is a measure of the difference between the two distributions. The expert who is being honest about what he knows or does not know (again, a reference to the origins of scoring rules as a training tool ) will be rewarded with a lower calibration score by more closely matching what he says to what he actually knows. In a perfectly calibrated expert, F i =R i . The second term, the expertise term, is essentially a measure of the spread of the experts' ''true'' underlying frequency distribution (F i ). The value of the total score is the same as the Brier score.
Our use of the Matheson and Winkler ( 1976 ) score varies from that in the original paper in one important respect. 4 In our study, R i is defined by the five fractiles for which concentrations of benzene in ambient, indoor, and personal air were elicited: 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.95. In practice, F i for an individual quantity is likely to be unknowable. Therefore, F i must be calculated as the c N = number of samples analyzed.
3 The Brier score is computed as the average of the squared differences between the stated probability R ij for the ith question, and in the jth class ( e.g., rain or no rain, m = 2 ) and the individual score achieved, s ij , where s ij = 1 if the response turns out to be correct and s ij = 0 if it does not:
Another difference is that Matheson and Winkler defined their score as negative although the interpretation is the same. Because most studies report the positive version of the Brier score and its components, we have used the same convention here.
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Use of expert judgment in exposure assessment: Part 2. Calibration of judgments about exposures to benzene frequency with which the ''truth'' ( e.g., the mean residential ambient benzene concentration in the NHEXAS Region V study ) falls at or below the concentrations the experts have said are associated with the ith fractile and can only be calculated across a sufficient number of questions. F i , and, consequently, a score, can only be calculated for an individual when a large number of questions have been asked of that individual. As only six questions were asked of each expert in this study, F i could not be reliably calculated for individual experts. Therefore, the score was only calculated for the experts' collective judgments about the means (n = 21), the 90th percentiles (n =21 ), and both quantities together (n =42). Using the total expected score, Winkler and Poses ( 1993 ) introduced two other measures of calibration; the ''correlation score'' and the ''skill score.'' The correlation score is simply the correlation between all R i and their corresponding individual scores, s i , for each fractile (s i = 0 if the truth does not fall at or below the concentration associated with that fractile and 1 if it does ). The higher the correlation between R i and s i , the better the agreement between what the experts say they know and how they perform.
The skill score is calculated as the percentage difference between the experts' total score and the total score that would have been obtained had the experts simply assumed a base rate for each probability assignment. Using weather forecasters as an example, the skill score would be the percent difference in total score they would achieve by predicting the daily probabilities of rain based on information about local conditions rather than by simply assuming the probability of rain to be the same each day and basing this estimate on the long -run probability of rain for the geographic area. For our study, the skill score was calculated by comparing the experts' score to the score they would have obtained had they simply taken their estimates of the means and 90th percentiles for residential ambient, indoor, and personal air benzene directly from a recent review of studies on benzene in air in the United States ( Wallace, 1996 ) .
5
Surprise and Interquartile Indices One of the most common and intuitive approaches to calibration of continuous probabilities is the use of the ''surprise index'' and the ''interquartile index.'' These indices are essentially another form of quantitative score but focus on performance at predicting particular ''credible'' or subjectively defined intervals. In addition to being readily comparable to the results of other calibration studies, these two indices are amenable to statistical confidence testing.
The surprise index is defined as the proportion of values falling outside the specified credible interval. For this study, where the experts were asked to estimate the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for each elicited quantity, the surprise index was calculated as the percentage of times that the ''truth,'' as defined by the NHEXAS study, fell below the 5th or above the 95th percentile -that is, outside the 90% credible interval. For our study, well -calibrated experts should have a surprise index of 10% indicating that they can characterize accurately how well they know the answers to the questions that have been posed. A surprise index of greater than 10% indicates that the experts are overconfident while a surprise index less than 10% suggests underconfidence.
The interquartile index is defined as the percentage of judgments where the truth falls within the interquartile range. For well-calibrated experts, the interquartile index should be 50%. An interquartile index of less than 50% is indicative of overconfidence.
We have examined the statistical significance of the surprise and interquartile indices in two ways, one in which independence between judgments is assumed and one in which some correlation is assumed. Statistical significance of the surprise and interquartile indices is rarely discussed in the expert judgment literature but most studies appear to assume that the judgments given are independent. In such cases, simple binomial probabilities of observing a given result ( e.g., 2 or more of 21 judgments outside the 90% credible interval ) are appropriate.
Correlations Within and Between Experts While assumptions of independence may suffice for studies in which unrelated almanac -type questions are administered to randomly selected individuals, they are not likely to be appropriate for this study in which related questions are asked of experts selected for their expertise in a particular subject. Correlations between judgments coming from a particular expert ( intraexpert correlation) or between judgments coming from separate experts (interexpert correlation ) can affect both the statistical significance of the calibration results and the collective informativeness of the judgments. Few studies of subjective judgment have taken such correlations into account in reporting their results.
Both types of correlation were suspected to exist given the design of this study. The experts were asked a series of questions about benzene concentrations that built sequentially upon one another; ambient benzene concentrations are a component of indoor concentrations of benzene which, in turn, contribute to personal exposure. While each 5 Wallace reports the ''global'' mean residential ambient and personal air concentrations from the Total Exposure Assessment Methodology ( TEAM ) studies to be 6 and 15 g / m 3 , respectively. The overall mean for indoor benzene concentrations and the 90th percentile estimates were not reported. The method used to develop the ''global'' estimates was not given in the paper but were approximately consistent with unweighted grand means for all of the studies in the paper. The corresponding 90th percentile estimates were 11, 18, and 31 g / m 3 for ambient, indoor and residential air, respectively. Modest uncertainty distributions with geometric standard deviations of 1.5 were assumed. probabilistic judgment reflects the individual expert's state of knowledge and is therefore unique in some regards, many of the experts defined similar conceptual or ''mental models'' ( Bostrom et al., 1992 ( Bostrom et al., , 1994 for estimating personal exposures to benzene and relied, to varying degrees, on the same studies of benzene levels in ambient, indoor and personal air ( Walker et al., 2001) . Consequently, positive correlations between experts' judgments about these quantities were expected. However, this study did not have a sufficient number of experts and questions to evaluate the impact of interexpert correlation on calibration.
Intraexpert correlations were estimated in two ways. Pairwise correlation coefficients were calculated for each set of judgments (e.g., ambient vs. indoor ) by an individual expert. The intraexpert correlation was also estimated using maximum likelihood methods to fit a beta -binomial model to the surprise and interquartile index results observed.
6 Our study compares the beta -binomial probabilities of success given the degree of intraexpert correlation estimated to the simple binomial probabilities calculated assuming independence of the responses.
Results

Expert Judgments About Benzene Concentrations in NHEXAS Region V Pilot Study
The experts' judgments about the NHEXAS estimates of the means and 90th percentiles of ambient, indoor, and personal air benzene are presented in three sets of figures. Figure 1A and B present the ambient distributions, Figure 2A and B the indoor distributions, and Figure 3A and B the experts' judgments about personal exposure. In these box plots, the plus sign denotes the experts' ''best estimate'' ( which they identified generally as the median ), the box represents the interquartile range, and the whiskers the 5th and 95th percentile of each quantity. The mean NHEXAS results are superimposed on each figure as a solid line.
With the exception of Expert F, all of the experts adjusted their original estimates of benzene levels from Part I of the study downward to account for possible bias in the NHEXAS study design and implementation. In other words, they felt that, on average, the NHEXAS study was likely to underestimate the true concentrations of benzene in Region V. Citing factors such as the study's use of passive, rather than active monitors, possible undersampling of counties during winter months when concentrations of benzene can be higher, and household selection bias that might favor exclusion of households with higher exposures, they believed it necessary to shift their distributions lower to bring their own predictions into line with what they believed NHEXAS would measure. The amount by which they lowered their original estimates ranged from about 5% to 40% depending on the expert and distribution.
Several experts ( C, E, F, and G ) also broadened or flattened their distributions to varying degrees. They did so to account for potential sources of random error arising from the NHEXAS study design and/or execution that would make it possible to observe results that were either lower or higher than they originally predicted. Some of the factors cited as making individual experts less certain about their original predictions included incomplete knowledge about the proper size of the bias correction, about the degree of interference both positive and negative with the sampling badges, and about the representativeness of the NHEXAS sample population of the full Region V population. Adjustments made to the original judgments varied considerably from expert to expert but in effect represented increases ranging from 10% to 70% in the standard deviations of the subjective distributions. Experts A, B, and D, though they cited possible sources of uncertainty in the NHEXAS study design, chose not to expand their distributions arguing that their original distributions were sufficiently broad to contain the NHEXAS study results.
Calibration of Expert Judgments
This section presents the results of the three methods used to assess the calibration of the experts' predictions of residential ambient, residential indoor, and personal air concentrations of benzene in the NHEXAS Region V study. The graphical results, the binary scoring rule, and the surprise and interquartile indices tell a consistent story about the experts' performance. As a group, the experts were able to predict the NHEXAS results in most cases although they were often underconfident in their ability to do so. Their judgments about the 90th percentiles were slightly better calibrated than those about the means. However, each approach also provides slightly different perspective on the experts' performance and so is useful to examine individually. Figures 1 through 3 make a strong visual statement about how the experts performed in this study. Most of the experts successfully predicted the results of the NHEXAS study (i.e., they specified subjective 6 The beta -binomial model has long been used to analyze data from animal experiments in which the experimental unit is a litter and where ''[ r ]esponses within a litter are assumed to form a set of Bernoulli trials whose success probability varies between litters in the same treatment group according to a two parameter beta distribution'' ( Williams, 1975 ) . In our study, each of the seven experts represents a ''litter,'' each of which has the same number of ''animals'' or questions. The experts 'surprise index or interquartile index results constitute binary response data. Using a model in S + developed by one of the authors, P. Catalano, to analyze experimental data with animals, two parameters of interest could be estimated: the mean success probability ( mean probabilities of surprise and of including the true NHEXAS values in the interquartile range ) across all experts and rho, r, a measure on intraexpert correlation ( Williams, 1975 ) .
Graphical Comparisons
distributions for the mean and 90th percentile of each benzene quantity which have successfully included the corresponding result from the NHEXAS study ). The figures also indicate that the experts were more successful at predicting the 90th percentiles than the means despite greater differences in their best estimates of the 90th percentiles. Experts D and E were the only experts whose distributions did not always include the ''truth.'' A visual inspection of the six sets of figures also indicates that the experts' best estimates of the means and, in particular, the 90th percentiles of the distributions were biased upwards. The figures also indicate that the experts' subjective distributions were generally lognormally distributed, being skewed generally toward higher concentrations.
Although Figures 1 through 3 provide a good overview of the results, they are difficult to compare to the findings of other calibration studies. The Matheson and Winkler ( 1976 ) scoring rule and the surprise and interquartile indices used in this study, on the other hand, provide quantitative measures of the experts' calibration which can serve as a basis for comparison with other published results. Figure 4 compares R i , the experts' stated probabilities, to the frequency distribution, F i , calculated for all judgments given in the NHEXAS findings.
Scoring Rule Results
The stated probability is on the x axis and the observed frequency on the y axis. The solid line connecting the squares reflects the experts' performance. The dashed line is a reference line representing perfect calibration.
At the lower fractiles, some indication of overconfidence exists, i.e., the experts have stated probabilities more extreme than their performance bears out. At the two upper fractiles, the experts have stated that they are less certain of their predictions than their performance subsequently bears out, suggesting some underconfidence. These observations are consistent with Figures 1 through 3 , which indicate that the experts' distributions have more often not extended to low enough concentrations to include the NHEXAS result whereas they have extended to very high concentrations which are inclusive of virtually all the NHEXAS results. The positive bias discussed earlier is also evident here; F i is greater than R i at the median. Despite the differences between R i and F i apparent in Figure 4 , the scores calculated for the experts as a group were indicative of good overall calibration. Table 2 shows the calibration, expertise, and total scores for the experts' judgments about the mean benzene concentrations, the 90th percentiles of the distributions of benzene concentrations, and both quantities combined. A score in which R i = F i would be 0.144 for the set of fractiles elicited in this study, all of which would be attributable to the expertise score. 7 Expertise scores greater than 0.144 suggest overconfidence while scores less than 0.144 are indicative of underconfidence.
The total score based on all of the experts' judgments about mean and 90th percentile benzene levels was 0.139. The expertise portion of the score was 0.121 suggesting underconfidence on average (an integration of the overconfidence and underconfidence discussed in the context of Figure 4 earlier). The differences between the stated probabilities and observed frequencies appear in the calibration score, which was 0.018.
The ''correlation score'' between the experts' stated probabilities and the individual scores for each fractile was 0.68 across all judgments suggesting general agreement between the two sets of number. (Given the fractiles elicited, the maximum positive correlation would be about 0.87. ) The correlation score was slightly better for judgments about the 90th percentiles than for judgments solely about the means.
The ''skill scores'' for the means, 90th percentile, and total set of judgments are also shown in Table 2 . They show that the experts' scores were 29-49% better than scores that would have been obtained from using summary data directly from Wallace's ( 1996 ) recent literature review of benzene levels in ambient, indoor and personal air. Although the latter approach to estimating the means and 90th percentiles was admittedly simplistic, it would not be out of the question. Several of the experts reviewed the data in that paper carefully and used them in varying ways as starting points for their predictions of benzene levels in Region V. Table 3 displays estimates of the intraexpert correlation obtained using the two methods described in the Methods section. The results all suggest that relatively strong positive correlation within experts that should be properly taken into account in considering the statistical significance of the calibration results. As shown in the table, differences emerge in the estimates of intraexpert correlation depending on the method used. Using the beta -binomial model, the degree of correlation estimated depended more strongly on how the judgments were grouped, with the judgments about mean benzene levels showing more correlation than those about the 90th percentiles.
Intraexpert Correlation
Surprise and Interquartile Indices
The tables in this section present results for the experts' judgments about the means, the 90th percentiles and for all judgments considered together. The data on surprise indices from this study are summarized in Table 4 while the interquartile index results are shown in Table 5 . The binomial probabilities under assumptions of independence and intraexpert correlation are shown in the last two columns of each table. Table 6 analyzes the judgments by individual experts.
We tested both the surprise index and interquartile index results against the null hypothesis that the experts were well calibrated ( i.e., that there would be no statistically significant difference between the result and the optimal value for good calibration). When tested under an assumption of independence, the surprise index results displayed in Table 4 showed weak statistical support (P= 0.05 ) for rejecting the null. These results support the conclusion that the experts were, as a group, overconfident in how well they could specify 90% credible intervals. The surprise index based on all judgments was 19%, exceeding the ideal of 10%. The data also suggested that the experts were more overconfident about the means than about the 90th percentiles. However, when correlation within experts was properly accounted for ( using the beta -binomial model described earlier ), it became evident that the data were not adequate to reject the null hypothesis. Similarly, the experts' apparent poorer calibration performance on the means compared to the 90th percentiles could only be viewed as suggestive, not conclusive.
The interquartile index results for the experts' judgments about benzene, as shown in Table 5 , provided suggestive, but again not conclusive, evidence of underconfidence. The interquartile index of 71% based on all judgments exceeded the ideal of 50% and under the assumption of independence of the judgments, appeared to provide relatively strong support ( P= 0.004 ) for the conclusion that the experts have provided unnecessarily broad interquartile ranges. As in the analysis of the surprise index results, however, when correlations among judgments given by the same experts were taken into account, the null hypothesis could again not be rejected at the P=0.05 level. The experts could be considered well calibrated.
While our study was not sufficiently large to investigate the properties of the judgments of individual experts, probing the individual results yielded some interesting insights. Close inspection of the distributions presented in Figures 1 through 3 suggests that there were differences in calibration among the experts. The disaggregated surprise index and interquartile index results summarized in Table 6 support this impression indicating that the group consisted of five generally underconfident experts and two generally overconfident ones. Those experts who were overconfident seemed to have been particularly overconfident about the tails of the distribution ( as indicated by the surprise index data ). In contrast, those who were underconfident tended to specify excessively broad interquartile ranges.
Discussion
Our study was undertaken to provide insight into the calibration of exposure assessment experts' probabilistic judgments about levels of benzene in ambient, indoor, and personal air. Specifically, we examined the ability of exposure assessment experts to predict the benzene concentrations in EPA Region V estimated by the NHEXAS Region V pilot study. Understanding of the calibration of experts' judgments about issues within those experts' own area of expertise is relatively limited; even less is known specifically about experts in the field of exposure assessment. Our study offers a careful evaluation of the performance of one set of exposure analysts and a perspective on their place in the constellation of studies on expert judgment calibration.
The graphical, scoring, surprise, and interquartile index analyses from this study provide both bad and good news about the calibration of the benzene experts in this study. They indicate that, as a group, the expert judgments were Pr( x ! number of surprises / N trials|probability of surprise = 0.1 ). b Pr( x ! number of surprises / N trials|probability of surprise = 0.1, intraexpert correlation = 0.7 ).
slightly biased toward higher benzene concentrations than were actually detected in the NEXHAS Region V pilot study. The maximum likelihood estimate of the average bias adjustment that would have brought the set of judgments into calibration was À 2.1 g/m 3 . The experts tended toward overconfidence in their specification of the tails ( particularly the lower tail ) of their distributions and toward underconfidence in their characterization of the interquartile range. Nonetheless, the evidence suggested that the experts were, as a group, relatively well calibrated.
Comparable studies, in addition to other measures of calibration or performance, must be used to provide perspective on particular scores. Finding comparable studies is somewhat difficult since few studies have reported on the calibration of experts' judgment and similar calibration methods are not always used. However, a handful of studies have reported scores using the same scoring rule used in our study (Murphy and Winkler, 1992; Winkler and Poses, 1993 ) . Winkler and Poses' study, in addition to reporting the scores of the physicians they studied, calculated the scores from data in several other physician studies (Samet et al., 1990; Tierney et al., 1986; DeSmet et al., 1979 ) . 8 With the exception of Murphy and Winkler (1992 ) who studied weather forecasters, all of the studies evaluated the performance of physicians at various diagnostic or predictive tasks. Table 7 compares the experts' scores to those of the subjects in the other studies.
The experts' scores did not always compare well to scores of subjects considered to be well calibrated although they were better than scores reported in studies where the subjects were clearly poorly calibrated. The experts' calibration scores 9 were three to five times higher, and therefore worse, than the scores reported for the wellcalibrated weather forecasters studied by Murphy and Winkler (1992 ) and the physicians in the Winkler and Poses (1993 ) study. At the same time, the benzene experts' scores were better, in some cases substantially, than those of physicians in two studies where the subjects were reported to perform poorly (DeSmet et al., 1979; Samet et al., 1990 ) . Both these studies reported much wider divergence between the physicians' stated probabilities ( R i ) and their observed frequencies of success ( F i ) than in our study. The experts' correlation and skill scores were comparable to those of the well calibrated physicians in the Winkler and Poses ( 1993 ) study. Winkler and Poses (1993) reported increasing correlation scores with increased experience and / or expertise, ranging from 0.54 for critical care fellows to 0.64 for primary attendings, the most experienced group. The correlation score for the experts participating in our study was 0.68. The average skill score for the experts in our study (39% -based on all judgments) was the same as that for the primary attendings. This result suggests that the experts in our study were more skilled at their predictions than an analyst who might simply rely on the data on benzene levels reported by Wallace ( 1996 ) without any adjustments. Pr( x ! successes / N trials ) | P( success ) = 0.5, no intraexpert correlation ). b Pr( x ! successes / N trials ) | P( success ) = 0.5, intraexpert correlation = 0.7 ).
c Not calculated because of the large numbers of combinations necessary to include. P value likely to increase because of evidence of correlation in interquartile index results ( see Table 3 ). Table 6 . Surprise and interquartile indices by experts. Pr( x ! surprises / N trials ) | P( surprise ) = 0.1, no intraexpert correlation ). d Pr( x ! successes / N trials ) | P( success ) = 0.5, no intraexpert correlation ). 8 We obtained each of these papers to reconfirm that the scoring rule used by Winkler and Poses was the same as that used in our paper. Besides these studies, Winkler and Poses also analyzed data from a study by Christensen -Szalanski, and Bushyhead ( 1981 ) . We could not confirm the scores from this study, and because they seemed suspect, we have not reported them here. 9 As discussed earlier, because the expertise portion of the score is in part determined by the fractiles elicited in a particular study, direct comparisons across studies may be misleading and are therefore not reported here.
The experts in our study performed slightly better than technical experts in the handful of studies in which the surprise index and interquartile index were used to assess the calibration of subjective judgments. The studies, summarized in Table 8 , indicate that the geotechnical engineers (Hynes and Van Marke, 1976 ) , physicists ( Henrion and Fischhoff, 1986 ) and mechanical engineers ( Cooke et al., 1988) evaluated were overconfident and, as a result, poorly calibrated. The relatively poor surprise index results in these studies are comparable to the poor performance by nonexperts reported by Lichtenstein et al. ( 1982 ) (as updated by Morgan and Henrion, 1990 ) . In those studies, the surprise indices were on average, between 30% and 40% but ranged from 5% to 50% compared to an ideal surprise index of 2%.
Although the benzene experts' performance at predicting the interquartile range was also suggestive of poor calibration, the basis for poor calibration differed from that in other studies. The experts and nonexperts reported on in other studies have been generally overconfident whereas the experts in this study tended to be underconfident.
Although the calibration findings from the scoring rule and from the surprise and interquartile indices did not always appear to be consistent, they reflect underlying differences and potential limitations of the different approaches to calibration. The scoring rule integrates performance across a whole distribution providing one summary measure of calibration but lacks a clear demarcation of where good calibration begins and ends. The surprise and interquartile indices, while they are amenable to statistical confidence testing, examine only one pair of fractiles at a time.
The experts' relatively strong performance at predicting 90th percentiles of benzene concentrations was surprising given the view that individuals usually perform more poorly at prediction of more extreme events ( Winkler and Poses, 1993) . Two factors may explain the findings. The first is that, during the elicitations, the experts expressed more confidence in the data available to predict the means than for the 90th percentiles of the distributions. Second, we had discussed the impact of using the various heuristics, including overconfidence, on calibration of judgments with the experts at both the workshop and during the individual interviews. Although most of the experts in this study relied on a process of anchoring and adjustment (i.e., beginning with a central value or best estimate and adjusting outward to establish credible intervals ) for their judgments about both the means and the 90th percentiles of the benzene distributions, they gave much broader probability distributions for the 90th percentiles than those for the means which may reflect the impact of training. They considered the 90th percentiles to be more difficult to predict and adjusted their distributions to reflect their relative lack of knowledge and to avoid overconfidence. This explanation is also consistent with the overall suggestion of underconfidence in the interquartile index results. This improvement in calibration with more diffuse distributions has been noted by other authors ( Cooke, 1991 ) and exemplifies an inherent tradeoff faced in the elicitation of judgments (Yaniv and Foster, 1997 ) . Experts who are can state both accurately and precisely what they know are preferable to those who are knowledgeable but who are less certain about what they know (and therefore give more diffuse probability distributions ). The ideal expert is one who knows the answer exactly. However, given the prevalence of different heuristics used in giving judgments that manifest themselves in overconfidence and therefore in inaccurate judgments, more diffuse, but potentially better calibrated judgments may be preferable when the ''truth'' is not known.
The importance of taking into account correlations within and between experts in the judgments has been the subject of study in other areas of subjective judgment research, most notably in the literature dealing with combination of experts' judgments. For reasons that are not clear, the impact of correlation on the statistical significance of calibration results has typically not been estimated. In his book on expert judgment, Cooke ( 1991 ) states: Expert assessments will generally be correlated (either 'within' or between experts), as they are based on common sources of information. Such correlation is usually benign and always unavoidable.
As Cooke suggested, we found that the experts' judgments were indeed highly correlated in most cases, but the impact on the statistical significance of their calibration results was not always benign. When the judgments from individual experts were all assumed to be independent, sufficient statistical evidence existed to state that the experts' judgments about the mean levels of benzene were not well calibrated at the P=0.05 confidence level. Once intraexpert correlation was taken into account using a beta -binomial model, the probability of observing the surprise index results increased substantially. The power of the study to detect poor calibration diminished.
We expect that the power of the study would decline further if interexpert correlation were also taken into account. We know that the judgments about individual benzene concentrations ( e.g., mean ambient ) were strongly correlated between experts. However, our study did not have a sufficient number of experts and questions to test this hypothesis.
The relatively good performance of the experts in our study is encouraging about the ability of exposure assessment analysts to give meaningful probabilistic judgments about exposure. However, because of its limited size and scope, important questions remain unresolved. For example, it was not possible to evaluate statistically the basis for the good overall performance of these experts. The type and level of expertise of the experts chosen, any professional biases or motivations they may harbor, the degree of difficulty of the questions, the nature and amount of training given the experts prior to the elicitations, the elicitation process itself, and the approaches taken by individual experts to answering the questions (e.g., the degree of disaggregation ), are all potential predictors of performance.
We suspect that the level of difficulty of the questions is likely to have played a role in the relatively good calibration of the experts in this study. We would hope, and some studies have shown (Christensen -Szalanski and Beach, 1984 ) , that individuals are better calibrated on subjects they know about. The concentrations of benzene in ambient, indoor, and personal air have been studied extensively in the last 10 to 15 years and are better characterized than the levels of most chemicals.
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It is also possible, as noted earlier, that training the experts received in the workshop and during the elicitation about the perils of heuristics and biases in giving judgments, had some influence on the judgments the experts they gave about the quantities that they felt they knew less about, the 90th percentiles of airborne benzene levels in Region V. Again, the study design does not permit this issue to be resolved.
The literature on the influence of training on calibration is also sparse and inconclusive. Morgan and Henrion's (1990) review of the literature indicated that training of experts using almanac -type questions had minor impacts on their performance at predicting continuous quantities as measured by the surprise and interquartile indices. However, they also cited work by Mullin (1986 ) suggesting that some techniques used during elicitation to counteract heuristics commonly used in giving probabilistic judgments may be more effective than others when using an ''information -based'' approach to elicit judgments from experts like that used in our study. Individuals were more likely to review the upper or lower bounds of their judgments when asked questions forcing them to reconsider the factual basis for their judgments ( ''informationseeking'' strategy ) than if they were simply warned against 10 This study originally envisioned expert judgment on a pair of chemicals, one for which substantial data existed and one about which little exposure data known. Benzene fulfilled the first requirement but circumstances prevented the second part of the study from being completed. possible heuristics ( ''counterheuristic'' strategy ) (Mullin, 1986 ) . We used the ''information -seeking'' strategy predominantly during the elicitations for the benzene study.
Knowing more about the role of these various factors would be useful in the elicitation of judgments from experts for other analytical tasks. However, design of appropriate studies involves difficult tradeoffs between a study design that is manageable for the expert 11 ( usually meaning fewer questions ) and one that is amenable to rigorous statistical analysis. Other issues, such as maintaining a similar degree of difficulty across a group of experts, remain challenging since even experts in the same field may vary substantially in the particulars of their academic training and expertise.
The difficulty in identifying, a priori, who is going to be well calibrated underscores the importance of using groups of experts for important questions. Our study suggested that the good calibration of the experts as a group was reliant on the combination of a group of generally underconfident experts and a couple of overconfident ones. Some individuals performed better than others and the outcome of decisions or analyses depending on these judgments could vary considerably.
Conclusions
Subjective judgment is an inevitable element of the scientific process in exposure assessment as it is in other areas of technical research. Judgments must be made about the quality, relevance, and sufficiency of data used to make innumerable decisions ranging from characterizing the parameters of a particular exposure model to assessing the human health impact of regulating chemical emissions from a facility. When substantial amounts of relevant data exist, classical statistical methods may be sufficient for characterizing what is known and not known -little disagreement may exist. But rarely is that the case. More often, deficiencies of one kind or another may exist, the importance of which may be the subject to legitimate professional disagreements. In such cases, uncertainties may be large and would not typically be captured in classical statistical estimates of uncertainty. Use of subjective judgment elicitation techniques is one method that can be used to characterize fully the contributions from all the key sources of uncertainty.
Part I of this study (Walker et al., 2001 ) demonstrated that, using principles of good elicitation practices, coherent probability distributions about levels of benzene in ambient, indoor, and personal air in U.S. EPA's Region V could be elicited from experts in this field. In the absence of appropriate measurement data, their probability judgments about the mean and 90th percentiles of benzene in ambient, indoor and personal air in Region V could be used as inputs to discussions about the appropriate level of regulatory concern about current levels of benzene or to decisions about the value and focus of future monitoring programs for benzene.
Judgments alone, however, have always faced an uphill battle to be considered acceptable substitutes for measurement data in environmental problems. This resistance often arises from the perception the experts may harbor technical or institutional biases and from the concern that, when external verification is not available, experts have little incentive to provide good judgments. The reality is that technical and institutional biases do exist but they exist whether judgment is included formally or informally in an analysis or in a decision -making process. When judgments are carefully and explicitly elicited, the opportunity exists to identify and quantify the impact of any biases. When the role of judgment remains hidden, as it often does in scientific endeavors, the degree of bias may be the same, but it cannot be dealt with explicitly.
Another impediment to the acceptance of expert judgments is that sparse evidence exists about the calibration or quality of probability judgments from experts, particularly in the environmental field. However, methods do exist to assess the calibration of expert judgments. This paper demonstrated that the exposure assessment experts participating in this study performed relatively well at predicting the concentrations of benzene in ambient, indoor and personal air for the sample population of the NHEXAS Region V study. Individual experts appeared to fall prey to the common heuristics and biases described in the subjective judgment literature and their judgments about the 90th percentiles, in particular, were biased upward and were unnecessarily broad. However, as a group, their judgments were consistent with a conclusion of good calibration. In other words, the experts were able to accurately predict the probability with which they could describe the means and 90th percentiles of benzene concentrations in ambient, indoor, and personal air of U.S. EPA Region V.
Using surprise and interquartile index results, our analysis demonstrated the importance of taking into account correlations within experts in appraising the statistical significance of calibration results. In this study, both interand intra-expert correlations were known to exist because of similarities in the underlying data and theory used by the experts to develop their judgments and because judgments about benzene in personal air, for example, were dependent on judgments about benzene in ambient and indoor air. We did not have sufficient data to evaluate the impact of interexpert correlation, but we were able to evaluate the impact of intraexpert correlation on the significance of the 11 Cooke ( 1991 ) recommends no more than two hours be spent at a time on an elicitation! calibration findings. We found that when the experts' judgments were assumed to be independent, the judgments about mean benzene concentrations could not be considered well calibrated. When intraexpert correlation was taken into account, the analysis had too little power to reject the null hypothesis of good calibration.
What assurance do these studies give that exposure assessment experts are, in general, well -suited to the task of giving probabilistic judgments about exposures to contaminants in environmental media? As is the case for many studies of subjective judgment, the generalizability of this study is limited. While our research offers encouraging news about the ability of a carefully selected group of benzene experts to answer the specific set of questions asked using the methods employed in this study, it faces many of the methodological questions inherent to studies of this kind.
Despite the reservations expressed about the generalizability of individual studies, we believe that it is important that work continue to be done to forge links between the disciplines which seriously investigate subjective judgment and the environmental health sciences. Environmental exposure assessment, with its opportunities for feedback from field studies, has both much to gain from as well as to offer this important area of research.
Future work should focus on the development of elicitation protocols, which streamline the elicitation process to the extent feasible to assist the participants in the process and which allow evaluation of some the factors that may be important in determining good calibration. Additional work needs to be done to assess the impact of interexpert correlation on calibration. Also, since the study of calibration in exposure assessment experts differs from that in weather forecasters where the ''truth'' or calibration standard can be known without error, new calibration methods need to be developed to take into account situations where the truth itself is uncertain. Since mathematical models as well as regulatory decisions that rely on uncertain information may desire single or ''consensus'' inputs, studies on the combination of expert judgments and the impact of combination on calibration should be done. Ultimately, as the purpose of this work is to improve analysis and decision making, important extensions of our findings would include comparison of the experts' judgments to the predictions of other modeling approaches (e.g., the Benzene Exposure and Absorbed Dose Simulation Model [ BEADS] by MacIntosh et al., 1995 ) and assessment of the impact of these differences on potential regulatory decisions.
Whether for reasons of affordability, feasibility or timing, we are never going to have all the data we might want to make every decision we face, but we may find that, with careful use of subjective expert judgment, we may get what we need.
